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On the Bicentenary of the Louisiana Supreme Court:
Chronicle of the Creation of a Unique and Beautiful
Legal Tradition
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
Editor’s Note: The Board of Editors of Volume 74 is thrilled to
welcome Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos back to the pages of the
Louisiana Law Review with his bicentenary remarks in the Chamber
of the Louisiana Supreme Court. His publicist, Professor Paul R.
Baier, joined the LSU Law Faculty a generation ago. He grew up as
a legal scholar in the shadow of his great Greek friend A. N.
Yiannopoulos. As Secretary of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
Copyright 2014, by A. N. YIANNOPOULOS.
* Emeritus (2006) Eason-Weinmann Professor of Law and Chair, Eason
Weinmann Center for International and Comparative Law, Tulane University Law
School. Emeritus (1979) Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University. Diploma in Law, 1950, LL.D 1955, University of Thessaloniki
(Greece); MCL, University of Chicago; LL.M, 1955, JSD, 1956, University of
California at Berkeley; Dr. Jur., 1960, University of Cologne (Germany); LL.D,
1995 (Dr. Honoris Causa), University of Thessalonki. Distinguished Professor,
Louisiana Bar Foundation, 2001. Professor Yiannopoulos is a world renowned
scholar of civil law, comparative law, and maritime law; he is a member of the
Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute and reporter for Civil Code revision.
His revision of the Preliminary Title of the Louisiana Civil Code became law in
1988; the revision of several Titles of Book I—Of Persons, including Title I—
Natural and Juridical persons, Title II—Domicile, and Title III—Absent Persons,
became law in 1988–2009. His revision of the entire Book II—Property became
law in 1977–1980, and his revision of several Titles of Book III—Modes of
Acquiring Ownership of Things, including Title V—Obligations Arising Without
Agreement, Title VI—Matrimonial Regimes, Title X—Annuities, Title XII—
Loan, Title XIII—Deposit and Sequestration, Title XV—Representation and
Mandate, Title XXII—Occupancy and Possession, Title XIV—Prescription,
became law in 1996–2013.
Professor Yiannopoulos has authored three volumes of the Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise, PROPERTY, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (3d ed. 1991)
(“Homage To Albert Tate, Jr. And Those Who Will Guard Thermopylae”);
PROPERTY, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2001) (“In gratitude to
those who bestowed the gift of eυ ζειν [Greek, “good life”] Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
Gerhart Kegel, Max Reinstein, Stefan Riesenfeld”); PERSONAL SERVITUDES, in 3
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2011) (“For the Women and Men of the
Law who Cherish the Beauty of the Civil Law of Louisiana”); PREDIAL
SERVITUDES, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013). He has edited
the Compiled Edition of the Louisiana Civil Code (West 2008) and, annually,
softback editions of Louisiana’s Civil Code (West 1980–2014). Dr. Yiannopoulos
is a member of the International Academy of Comparative Law (The Hague), the
International Association of Civil Procedure, and the American Law Institute. He
continues to teach one course each year at Tulane Law School, pro bono publico,
in his area of expertise, especially the acclaimed Civil Law Seminar.
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Historical Society, he introduced Professor Yiannopoulos to the
overflow crowd that attended the Historical Society’s annual meeting
celebrating the bicentennial of the Louisiana Supreme Court, 1813–
2013. His remarks are published here as a permanent record of their
camaraderie, both civil and common, for more than 40 years. The
“mystery justice” mentioned in Professor Yiannopoulos’s address is
the Honorable James L. Dennis, distinguished LSU Law School
alumnus, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice, 1975–1995, and Judge,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, since 1995. Judge
Dennis’s portrait, a gift to the Court from his family, was unveiled
following Professor Yiannopoulos’s bicentenary chronicle.
INTRODUCTION BY PAUL R. BAIER**
On the Occasion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
Historical Society’s Annual Membership Meeting,
Oct. 21, 2013,
Celebrating the Bicentennial of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, 1813–2013,
In the Chamber of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
400 Royal Street, New Orleans
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN—According to Greek mythology, the
Goddess Athena sprang fully limbed from the forehead of Zeus.
According to world opinion, A. N. Yiannopoulos is Zeus.
Have a look at his profile posted on the Internet.1 His visage is
beautiful. He is Tulane Law School’s Greek god.
I knew him a generation ago at LSU Law School.2 Today, we
love each other. Why is that? To quote Thanassi’s explanation to me
precisely: “GREAT BAIER, THANK GOD WE ARE BIOPHILES.”
** George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Judge Henry A. Politz
Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. J.D.
Harvard Law School, 1969; Secretary, Louisiana Supreme Court Historical
Society since 2007.
1. A. N. Yiannopoulos, TULANE U. L. SCH., http://www.law.tulane.edu/tls
faculty/profiles.aspx?id=480 [http://perma.cc/8FFZ-K823] (archived Feb. 14, 2014).
2. New to Louisiana and a mere common law lawyer, I joined students in
Professor Yiannopoulos’s Louisiana Civil Law System course to learn something
about the civil law. His classes were galvanic. We were sitting at the feet of a civil
law giant. He nursed us on his Louisiana Civil Law Coursebook, including its
Appendix of Cases and Materials for Class Discussion. The book’s preface is pure
A. N. Yiannopoulos:
The study of the civil law is an international undertaking which,
necessarily leads to the fraternization of civilians across national
boundaries. It guides to systemization of law and to its improvement as to
both substance and form. Experience of thousands of years becomes
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The bas-relief announcing the Yiannopoulos Professorship at
LSU Law Center carries one of Professor Yiannopoulos’s favorite
legal locutions:
“THE CIVIL LAW IS BEAUTIFUL.”
And so for our Society’s Bicentennial Celebration, would you
please join me in welcoming Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos, “Mégas
Yiannopoulos,” who will sketch the creation of a unique and
beautiful legal tradition, the living legacy of 200 years of the
Louisiana Supreme Court.
Professor Yiannopoulos.
I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Johnson, Chief Justice Calogero, Justices of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, Judge Dennis, Members of the Louisiana
Supreme Court Historical Society, Distinguished Guests:
I wish to thank my great friend Paul Baier for the invitation to
participate in the annual meeting of the Louisiana Supreme Court
Historical Society in the Bicentenary of that august institution.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, THE CIVIL CODE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The contributions of the Louisiana Supreme Court to the legal
culture of the State, the United States, and, indeed, the world, are an
epic worthy of a Homeric ode or a heroic Nordic saga narrating the
creative labor of several generations of jurists who transformed an
amorphous mass of sources from two distinct legal traditions to an
organic whole. This—the Louisiana civilian tradition.
The accomplished synergy and fusion of the Greco-Roman
civilian tradition with the Anglo-Saxon common law, both of which
emigrated from the European continent to the New World, and the
transformation of ancient diverse institutions into living law fit for a
contemporary vibrant society are works of art.
In marked contrast with supreme courts in European countries
that have limited judicial powers, the Louisiana Supreme Court, like
the supreme courts of the United States and sister states, has been
vested since its creation with broad judicial powers and functions.

meaningful for the scholar and useful for the legislator, the judge, and the
practitioner.
A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM COURSEBOOK, at iii
(1977).
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Much has been written and will continue to be written about the
work of the Louisiana Supreme Court in various fields.3 However,
this brief account is focused exclusively on a theme that is close to
my heart—the historical interaction of the Louisiana Supreme Court
with the Louisiana Civil Code and the development of the distinct
Louisiana civilian tradition.
The backbone of that tradition is the Louisiana Civil Code. Its
flesh and bones are Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine. Its
foundation is 3,000 years of Western culture and civilization.
The Louisiana Civil Code is a unique charter and a social
compact of fundamental significance for civilized life that was
enacted in the territorial days but is inextricably interwoven with the
Louisiana Constitution from the date Louisiana became a state.
The Louisiana Constitution of 1812, though an all-American
document, contained a conspicuous singularity still found in the
Constitution of 1974, Louisiana’s latest Code of Public Law, as
article III, section 15(B), forbidding adoption of a system or code of
laws. The prohibition has obviously been intended to preserve the
integrity of the Civil Code and the civilian tradition. As a result,
from the start, the attitude of the Louisiana Supreme Court toward
the Civil Code had constitutional implications for the Code’s
integrity and preservation.
Concerning the significance of the Louisiana Civil Code, I am
tempted to quote from the Foreword in the current edition of the
Code by Colonel John H. Tucker, Jr., that is addressed to his
brethren of the legal profession in Louisiana:
[This] is your most important book because it ushers you
into society as a member of your parents’ family and
regulates your life until you reach maturity. It then
prescribes the rules for the establishment of your own family
by marriage and having children, and for the disposition of
your estate when you die, either by law or by testament
subject to law. It tells how you can acquire, own, use and
dispose of property onerously or gratuitously . . . . You
should be well-grounded in the civil law if you engage in the
general practice of law in Louisiana.4

3. My precious friend and self-proclaimed publicist Paul Baier has explored
the origins of judicial review in Louisiana, a bicentenary essay of his own, in his
beloved field of public law. Paul R. Baier & Georgia D. Chadwick, Judicial
Review in Louisiana: A Bicentennial Exegesis, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 7 (2012).
4. John H. Tucker, Jr., Foreword to A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE, at XXXIX–XL (2014).
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It is a historical twist of fate that the Louisiana Civil Code of
1808, which derived from the Spanish and French civilian traditions,
was destined from the beginning to be interpreted and applied by
common law judges rather than civilian jurists. All the justices of
the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans were trained in the
common law tradition. Only François Xavier Martin, though a noncivilian, was impressed with civilian thought and translated into
English and printed Pothier’s great treatise on obligations in his own
shop. When the Louisiana Supreme Court was established by the
1812 Constitution, none of the first justices, George Matthews, Jr.,
Dominick A. Hall, and Pierre Derbigny, was a civilian. The entire
Louisiana judicial system was modeled on the system prevailing in
sister states and had nothing in common with the organization and
administration of justice in European countries.
A tension between the ideological and educational orientation of
the Louisiana judiciary and the legislative and cultural foundation of
the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808, 1825, and 1870, which shared
the formal qualities and organization of the Code Napoléon, was
expectable. Those codes were conceived as a self-contained and
complete legislative statement of principles, rather than rules,
intended to limit and control the judicial authority and law making.
A civil code, however, is not a self-executing document. Its
words and phrases, regardless of the clarity of expression, must be
given meaning for application to particular disputes and
individualized situations. This labor of interpretation and application
of the governing Civil Code provisions is a judicial function
performed in civil law countries with the assistance of doctrine,
namely the accumulated wisdom of generations of legal scholars.
This is a natural consequence of the origin of civil law systems, all
of which owe their creation to centuries of learned elaboration in
universities. In those legal systems, civil codes are not merely words
and phrases but depositaries of a legal order founded on ideals of
justice and rational thinking.
Apart from doctrine, judicial creativity is everywhere
indispensable for the shaping of legal traditions. In common law
systems, prevailing theories of precedents assert the lawmaking
function of the courts. In civil law systems, officially, the sources of
law are only legislation and custom, and so declares authoritatively
article 1 of the Louisiana Civil Code.5 The judicial decisions simply
form a gloss on legislative texts for their interpretation and
application. Isolated decisions are not “law,” but a series of judicial
decisions may be binding as customary law or jurisprudence
constante.
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2014).
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For a realistic understanding of the role of judicial decisions in
civil law jurisdictions, let us remember the words of the judicious
Portalis, the preeminent redactor of the Code Civil:
[B]ut there must be a body of case law. In the host of
subjects that make civil matters, the judgments of which, in
most cases, require less an application of a precise provision
than a combination of several provisions leading to the
decision rather than containing it, one cannot dispense with
case law any more than he can dispense with legislation . . . .
It is for experience gradually to fill the gaps we leave. The
Codes of nations are the fruit of the passage of time, but
properly speaking, we do not make them.6
The Society’s Secretary Paul Baier, to his credit, is the first legal
scholar in the United States to explicitly recognize the relevance of
Portalis’s insight to American Constitutional Law.7 I wish I could
say I taught him well. But he sees the analogy for himself and,
wisely, broadcasts it worldwide. I love him dearly. As he said, we
are both biophiles.
III. CREATIVE JURISPRUDENCE
In accord with Portalis, for two centuries, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has been infusing life into inert words and phrases of
the Civil Code. In doing so, the Louisiana Supreme Court drew
inspiration from a variety of sources, civilian and non-civilian, and
resorted to several methods of interpretation, starting with exegesis
and proceeding to free scientific research and the functional method.
The Louisiana Supreme Court assumed leadership in giving
form and substance to an indigenous legal tradition that had taken
hold in Louisiana for many decades preceding statehood. Up to the
end of the 1950s, the Louisiana Civil Code was essentially the Code
of 1870 that, with minor modifications, had reproduced the text of
the Civil Code of 1825. Amendments to and repeals of articles were
extremely rare. The reverence of the Louisiana Legislature for the
integrity of the Code was such that it was harder to amend the Code
in the Legislature than to pass a resolution contemplating an
amendment to the State Constitution.

6. PRELIMINARY DISCOURSE ON THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE (1800) (M.
Shael Herman trans.) reprinted in Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or Code
Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 772–73 (1969).
7. Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the Cours Mirabeau,
43 AM. U. L. REV. 707, 707–09 (1994).
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The pressing need for new legislation governing important
property rights led the Louisiana Supreme Court, in the presence of
an inactive Legislature, to fill severe legislative gaps by a creative
jurisprudence. The whole field of mineral law, starting with the
Frost Johnson decision, was a judicial creation based on analogy to
Civil Code provisions governing servitudes.8
Further, the legislative gap concerning subdivision planning led
the Louisiana Supreme Court to the development of a body of law
that became known as “building restrictions.”9 In that field, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, starting with Justice Provosty’s opinion
in Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, creatively converted the
common law feudal institution of covenants “running with the land”
into a modern and most important tool for land development.10 It
was only in 1977 that the jurisprudence governing building
restrictions was codified as articles 775–783 of the Louisiana Civil
Code.
When pressing social and economic needs called for new
legislation in civil law fields, special statutes were enacted that
repealed the contrary provisions of the Civil Code tacitly rather than
expressly. In those circumstances, the Louisiana Supreme Court
assumed an important role that is not found in other legal systems,
that is, to perform an educational mission.
IV. EDUCATIONAL MISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Systematic Louisiana legal treatises and law reviews were
missing. The first law school in the state, that of Tulane University,
was established in 1847, and the Tulane Law Review was established
in 1916 as the Southern Law Quarterly. Louisiana’s three other law
schools and their law reviews were established in the 20th century.
The first volume of West’s Louisiana Civil Law Treatise series, titled
Civil Law Property, was published in 1966. The series now contains
19 scholarly volumes.
For more than a century, Louisiana doctrine was found only in
monumental decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. One may
cite several opinions of Justice Provosty that are in reality doctoral
dissertations. Such is his multipage separate opinion in Louisiana &
Arkansas Railway Co. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co.—a diatribe on

8. Frost Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1920).
9. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 229, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 450 n.3 (4th ed. 2001).
10. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641 (La. 1915).

656

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

the notion and function of real rights based on an exhaustive
analysis of the historical sources of the Louisiana Civil Code.11
One may also cite and quote from a contemporary source an
opinion of a mystery justice, learned civilian, and the current
panhypersebastos12 of the Louisiana Bartolus Society, whose
portrait will be unveiled shortly. In Ardoin v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co., he undertook to instruct lower courts concerning the
use of correct methodology.13 In his stentorian voice:
[T]he lower courts did not follow the process of referring first
to the code and other legislative sources but treated language
from a judicial opinion as the primary source of law . . . .
[T]he notion of [s]tare decisis, derived as it is from the
common law, should not be thought controlling in this state.
The case law is invaluable as previous interpretation . . . but it
is nevertheless secondary information . . . . [T]he appeals
court measured the enactment solely against language
contained in a judicial opinion. The basic error in this method
of interpretation is that it not only ignores the first principles
of our law but it also assumes that jurisprudence is equivalent
to legislation instead of treating it as judicial interpretation
which may or may not adequately reflect the meaning of the
laws for contemporary purposes.14
Another landmark decision is Lovell v. Lovell.15 Mrs. Lovell
sought alimony after a divorce from her former husband under
Louisiana Civil Code article 160.16 Mr. Lovell claimed that article
160 constituted a denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution.17
The trial judge concluded that article 160 was unconstitutional
under the state and federal constitutions in view of the decision of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr in which it was held that the
Alabama statutes imposing alimony obligations only on husbands
11. La. & A. Ry. Co. v. Winn Parish Lumber Co., 59 So. 403 (La. 1911).
12. “Panhypersebastos” (Greek: πανυπερσέβαστος) means “venerable above
all.” The venerable John H. Tucker, Jr., of Shreveport, was known among his
friends in the Bartolus Society by the same title of Panhypersebastos (universally
most respected one). See A. N. Yiannopoulos, John H. Tucker, Jr., The
Jurisconsult, 45 LA. L. REV. 1011 (1985). “To law professors summoned to
Shreveport for consultations and planning, he was the Pope, and to most people he
was simply the Colonel.” Id. at 1011.
13. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
14. Id. at 1335.
15. Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
16. Id. at 419.
17. Id.
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after divorce and not on wives violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that article 160,
by placing alimony obligations on husbands after divorce but not on
wives, was unconstitutional.19 This was before the 1979 amendment
to article 160 making it a gender-neutral classification.20 But the
Court declared that this decision shall not be retroactive, and all
judgments awarding alimony prior to the effective date of the
amendment (June 29, 1979) remain unaffected by this decision.21
In a concurring opinion that may rightly be termed “didactic,”
our mystery justice showed the civilian path to the same result:
Article 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code is not
unconstitutional, because it is silent as to alimony for
husbands after divorce and cannot be presumed to manifest a
legislative intention to practice gender-based discrimination.
By proceeding and deciding according to equity, see La.C.C.
art. 21, civilian tradition, and state constitutional law, this
Court should hold that a husband must be awarded alimony
under the same circumstances in which it can be claimed by
the wife.22
V. A LOUISIANA SYNTHESIS
A study of the methods of interpretation of the Louisiana
Supreme Court demonstrates the frequent use of exegesis and free
scientific research but also a Louisiana original, a method of
interpretation that comprises elements of both exegesis and free
scientific research. Reliance on a particular method of interpretation
frequently depends on the subject matter, the relative age of a
legislative text, and on whether there is a directly applicable text. In
civil law matters, legislative texts continue to be applied with a
certain degree of rigidity, but when no rule for a particular situation
can be derived from legislation or custom—the “unprovided for”
case—the rules of decision are exceptionally derived from equity, as

18. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
19. Lovell, 378 So. 2d at 420–21.
20. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 112 (2014) (using the word “spouse” instead of
“wife”).
21. Lovell, 378 So. 2d. at 422.
22. Id.
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defined in article 4 of the Civil Code,23 or through free scientific
research.24
Toward the end of the 19th century, the excesses of conceptual
jurisprudence generated severe criticism and adverse reaction on the
European continent and in the United States. A frontal attack took
place against geometrical legal thinking and a priori ideas in the
interpretation and application of laws. A series of treatises
elaborated on the purpose of law and demonstrated how
considerations of social utility could replace dry logic in the judicial
process. A jurisprudence of interests and a teleological method of
interpretation thus began to take hold in continental countries. The
movement was bolstered in the 20th century by the development of
new theories of law and reliance on legal sociology and psychology.
In the United States, influential and articulate judges such as
Gray, Holmes, and Cardozo undertook a profound examination of
the judicial process and contributed to the dissipation of unrealistic
ideas, fictions, and half-truths. Von Ihering’s ideas were espoused
by American scholars, and considerations of social utility and
purpose led to the idea that law is a means to the end of social
engineering. In the 1930s, a realistic movement flourished in the
United States. It contributed to a better understanding of the judicial
process by testing conclusions against the background of actualities
and gave expression to the functional method of interpretation.
Since the middle of last century, decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court demonstrate the use of that new, essentially
American creation—the functional method of interpretation.
According to this method of interpretation, the application of a
legislative text to a conflict of interests must be determined in light
of the text’s social purpose. This calls for consideration of the
general policy that prompted the enactment of legislation, that is, the
general purpose behind the regulation of the type of conflict of
interests in question and the practical reasons for that purpose. The
particular conflict of interests before the court is to be resolved in
accordance with the general policy considerations that prompted
legislative action, rather than by reliance on logical deductions from
the language of the text. This process is avoidable when the formal
wording of a text provides a rule that resolves the dispute
satisfactorily or compels literal application.

23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (as revised in 1987); LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1870);
LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1825); LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1808).
24. See generally FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND
SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1963).
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The functional method of interpretation continues to be
prevalent in Louisiana jurisprudence. This is natural because
contemporary judges and academics, as well as practicing lawyers,
have been trained under the influence of American neo-realism. The
exegetical method never reigned in the jurisprudence of Louisiana
Supreme Court, but in civil law matters, judicial decisions reached
under the influence of French commentators often reflect the results
of that method.
Looking to the future, one may assert that there is a place in
Louisiana jurisprudence for both the exegetical and functional
methods of interpretation. Techniques of the exegetical method may
still be utilized when a provision of law may be regarded as
reasonably intended to apply to the conflict of interests before the
court. The functional method may be relied upon to ensure that a
legislative text is applied in accordance with underlying social
purposes. Exegesis may still be useful for determining the original
purpose of a text. With that purpose in mind, the judge may decide
whether social and economic conditions still accord with the
traditional meaning of the text or compel reinterpretation to suit new
demands.
Decisions of Justice Albert Tate, Jr. are brilliant examples of the
proper application of various methods of interpretation. Take the
case of Sanders v. Hisaw.25 On the morning of May 3, 1953, two
automobiles were traveling in the same direction on a divided, fourlane highway near Baton Rouge.26 Hisaw drove one of the
automobiles on the inside lane.27 Miss Marshall drove the other
automobile on the outside lane.28 Hisaw was about to overtake the
Marshall vehicle when Marshall suddenly turned left across the path
of the Hisaw vehicle.29 Hisaw could not avoid colliding with her.30
The trial court dismissed the suit against Hisaw.31 On appeal, it
was argued that Hisaw failed to sound his horn as he was overtaking
Marshall, that there was a violation of a statutory duty to sound the
horn, and therefore that Hisaw was liable.32 Justice Tate’s holding
reflects application of the functional method of interpretation in the
United States and accords with the teleological interpretation in
most civil law countries and Gény’s free scientific research in
France. Justice Tate’s realism shone:
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Sanders v. Hisaw, 94 So. 2d 486 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
Id. at 487.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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We do not believe this statutory provision to be applicable to
the present situation. The accident occurred on a four-lane
highway; two lanes were reserved for each direction’s traffic.
If applicable to multiple-laned highways, motor vehicles
would be required to sound the horn when passing any vehicle
going in the same direction whether to their right or left and
no matter how many lanes distant they might be. On our
crowded eight-lane and four-lane highways designed to
facilitate the passage of congested traffic there would be a
never-ending cacophony of constantly blowing horns, an
intolerable burden both on the ears of the public and on the
batteries of the vehicles involved in the crowded traffic. We
do not believe the legislature intended the statute to apply in
such circumstances or that the legislative provision
contemplated application thereof to multiple-lane highways.33
By 1950, the great debate—whether Louisiana is a civil law
jurisdiction or just another common law state—had subsided, but its
echoes continued to reverberate. Gradually, realism led to the ideas
that Louisiana was not a civil law jurisdiction like France or
Germany, that Louisiana’s law has a civil law component as well as
a common law component, and that Louisiana is a “mixed
jurisdiction.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court assumed leadership in giving
form and substance to the legal tradition that had been taking hold
for more than a century. Curricula in the law schools of Louisiana
were constantly enriched with the addition of civil law courses, but
all civil law subjects were taught by the case method with materials
emulating common law casebooks. Doctrinal works in the form of
treatises and monographs were sparse and mostly obsolete;
however, the Tulane Law Review, the Louisiana Law Review, and
the Loyola Law Review were repositories of impressive civilian
scholarship in the form of articles, comprehensive student
comments, and student notes.
VI. EPILOGUE
Mitchell Franklin wrote in 1932 that:
The Civil Code of Louisiana is the most important
contribution of Louisiana to an American culture. It possibly
is the most important accomplishment in the history of
American law in the sense of the relation it bears to the
future direction of American law. . . . As a cultural document
33. Id.
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the Civil Code has its own merit. It is beautifully written,
and so carries on the best traditions of civilian aesthetics.34
Thanks to the leadership of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
Louisiana Civil Code continues to enjoy an excellent state of health
and vigor. It is true that the Civil Code of Louisiana does not have
the cohesion and inner consistency of style and substance that it had
in 1870 and as late as 1950. The Preliminary Title of the Civil Code,
the entire Book I—Of Persons, the entire Book II—Things and the
Different Modifications of Ownership, and 21 Titles of Book III—
Of the Different Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things have
been revised, and several committees can hardly enhance uniformity
of style, regulation, and policy. Nevertheless, the revision produced
legislation that reflects the contemporary life and the aspirations of
Louisiana’s citizens. In our times, the Louisiana Civil Code in the
hands of Louisiana judges is a vibrant legislative text ordering the
most important relations of citizens from birth to death. It carries
with it the wisdom, the erudition, and the legal faith of Louisiana’s
great justices over two centuries, past and present.
This is an everlasting legacy that, combined with the evolving
texts of the Civil Code, constitutes an integrated whole, The
Louisiana Civilian Tradition. The celebrated opinions, concurrences,
and even dissents of justices such as Barham, Dixon, Martin,
Provosty, Sanders, and Tate, to name but a few who are no longer
with us, have not lost any of their brilliance and substance despite the
passage of time and the evolution of legal texts.
The judicial opinions of justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court
over two centuries of dispensation of civil justice are monuments of
juridical craftsmanship. The Court has spoken authoritatively and
convincingly in all fields of civil law. Its methodology and style,
widely accepted by the legal profession and the citizens of
Louisiana, have deeply influenced lower Louisiana courts. Many of
the great contributions of Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence
are in areas of civil law that our High Court sought to modernize.
VII. A FINAL BICENTENARY PLEA
In France, Henri Capitant, François Terré, and Yves Lequette
have authored two volumes, now in their 12th edition, entitled Les
Grands Arrêts de la Jurisprudence Civile.35 More than a quarter
century ago, Justice Tate suggested a collaboration of Louisiana
34. Mitchel Franklin, Book Review, 7 TUL. L. REV. 632, 632–33 (1933)
(reviewing BENJAMIN W. DART, CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA (1932)).
35. HENRI CAPITANT, FRANÇOIS TERRÉ & YVES LEQUETTE, LES GRANDS
ARRÊTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE (Dalloz ed., 12th ed. 2007).
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judges and legal scholars for the collection and publication in a
commemorative volume entitled The Great Decisions of Louisiana
Civil Law Jurisprudence.
Death put an abrupt end to Justice Tate’s aspiration. Still the
idea remains alive, and it may be fulfilled. Historical decisions of
the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrating innovative approaches
to Civil Code interpretation and application should be made
available, and become known, to sister states and other parts of the
world for study by judges and scholars interested in the history,
present and future, of the civilian tradition. Such a collection would
show the way in which jurisprudence and legislation may fruitfully
interact and be constantly updated as living law in our complex,
multicultural, industrialized society the world over.
It is here that the leadership of the Historical Society of the
Louisiana Supreme Court is in demand.

